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A widespread concern about Basel II capital requirements is that it might amplify business cycle 
fluctuations, forcing banks to restrict their lending when the economy goes into recession. Under 
the IRB approach of Basel II, capital requirements are increasing functions of the probability of 
default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD) parameters estimated for 
each borrower, and these inputs are likely to rise in economic downturns. In this paper, we 
compare two alternative procedures that are designed to somehow moderate the procyclical 
effects induced by Basel II - type capital regulation. The starting points of our analysis consist 
Jokivuolla, Kiema and Vesala (2009) and Repullo and Suarez (2009), who both examined the 
impact of regulatory capital’s procyclical effects. It’s vital to note remarks of Caprio (2009), that 
is, making regulatory capital levels countercyclical could worsen the state of an economy during 
a recession. As we do not have access to the Romanian Central Credit Register database, we 
compute a model-economy that stands as a proxy for the Romanian firms’ sector. Our simulated 
Romanian economy can be characterised by all Romania-specific macroeconomic controls. Then 
we  estimate  a  model  of  PDs  during  the  period  2000  –  2010,  and  based  on  the  estimated 
probabilities of default we compute the corresponding series of Basel II capital requirements. 
After the diagnosis of procyclicality, we analyze two procedures that try to mitigate the cyclical 
effects of capital regulation: smoothing the output of the Basel II formula, and smoothing the 
input,  by  construction  of  through-the-cycle  (TTC)  PDs.  The  comparison  of  the  different 
procedures is based on the criterion of minimizing the root mean square deviations of each 
adjusted series. Our results show that the best ways to moderate procyclicality are either to 
smooth the input of the Basel II formula by using through-the-cycle PDs, or to smooth the output 
with a multiplier based on GDP growth. We conclude that the GDP-based smoothing may be 
more efficient than the use of TTC PDs in terms of simplicity and transparency. In terms of the 
GDP  adjustment,  regulatory  capital  levels  should  increase  with  approx.  1,31%  during  an 
economic growth period and decrease with 4,03% during a recession, in order to mitigate the 
cyclical effects induced by Basel II – type capital regulation.  
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I. Introduction 
The financial crisis proved that the capital requirements system, which is based on risk weights 
defined by Basel II, can’t adapt to the new economic prosperity. The recession is aggravated by 
the  fact  that  the  banks  were  forced  to  squeeze  their  credits  and  this  caused  a  delay  in  the 
economy’s availability to grow. Several financial analysts pointed out the errors in the system, 
therefore the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision must find a solution in order to develop 
the model.  
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In our paper we compute an in-depth analysis on the issue of the procyclicality, comparing two 
possible methods that can be used to mitigate the cyclical effects of Basel II regulatory capital. 
The procyclical effect can be observed in historical data from the banking sector, since the capital 
regulation  based  on  risk  weights  is  very  prosperity-sensitive:  in  recession  the  credit  losses 
consume the bank’s capital, while venture capital increases. If banks aren’t able to gain enough 
capital for credit losses in a short period of time, then credit-crunch may occur. This kind of 
process characterizes perfectly the financial crisis. This leads to the fact that banks can’t even 
provide loans for customers with high ratings because of the inadequate level of capital.  
The structure of our paper is the following: in the first part we compute a brief review of the 
literature regarding the issue of procyclicality. This will be followed by an analysis regarding the 
methods of reducing the procyclical effects, by the use of a logistic model containing a one-
month-ahead probability of default (PD). Our goal is to find an answer to the fact that the cyclical 
effects can be effectively mitigated by fine-tuning of the PD indicators or by the change of the 
capital requirements. In the conclusion, we seek for other problems that arise when allocating 
regulatory capital. 
 
II. Literature Review 
We analyzed a series of different papers about procyclicality and its issues. Firstly we noticed 
that Jokivuolla, Kiema and Vesala (2009) and Repullo and Suarez (2009) both examined the 
impact of the regulatory capital’s procyclical effects. Contrary to Repullo and Suarez, Jokivuolla, 
Kiema and Vesala created a comparison between the regulatory capital requirements of the Basel 
I and Basel II. Their main question was that whether the risk-based or the constant weights-based 
regulatory capital requirement shows less procyclical impacts on the credit market. They used a 
simplified model, which interprets 3 types of market participants: low-risk profile investors, high-
risk profile investors and risk-free investors. Their conclusion was that the optimal risk-based 
capital is the least procyclical. They added that the present Basel II’s necessary direction for 
further development is the implementation of a higher venture capital. Repullo and Suarez used a 
dynamic equilibrium model in which the banks can’t access stock markets in any period. Their 
conclusion was that, in the case of Basel II Capital Requirements, capital reserves constituted by 
banks are higher during an economic boom than during recessions.  
Secondly, we observed that Pederzoli, Toricelli and Tsomocos (2009) analyzed the problem of 
procyclicality with comparing two rating systems. They built up a general equilibrium model 
which  contains  2  heterogeneous  banks,  2  companies  and  1  household.  They  found  that  the 
cyclical  rating  system  results  higher  default  rates  and  lower  profit  in  the  case  of  banks  in 
recession times.  
Kashyap and Stein (2004) argue that if the shadow value of bank capital is low in expansions and 
high in recessions, optimal capital charges for each type of risk should depend on the state of the 
business cycle. Without such adjustments, capital requirements would be too low in expansions, 
when bank capital is relatively plentiful and has a low shadow value, and too high in recessions, 
when the shadow value of bank capital goes up, leading to the amplification of business cycle 
fluctuations. Greenspan (2002) noted that “the supervisory leg of Basel II is being structured to 
supplement market pressures in urging banks to build capital considerably over minimum levels 
in  expansions  as  a  buffer  that  can  be  drawn  down  in  adversity  and  still  maintain  adequate 
capital.” 
Lastly, Caprio (2009) studied the counter-cyclical capital requirements definition and Repullo, 
Saurina and Trucharte (2010) analyzed and compared the procedures which mitigate the effects 
of  the  procyclical  capital.  The  foundation  of  Caprio’s  research  was  a  macroeconomic  data 
analysis from Spain and Columbia. His conclusion was that the risk-based capital regulatory 
system’s rectification results only short term adjustments. On the other side, Repullo, Saurina and 
Trucharte used data from Spanish companies and estimated a PD model. His results from this  
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research were very complex. Adjusting the output side of the Basel II formula with a credit 
growth multiplier or a yield multiplier, we don’t receive the optimal level of capital from the 
procyclical point of view. They found two possible solutions for handling the procyclicality: the 
first one is the input side smooth tuning, and the second one is on the output side, which can be 
received with the help of a multiplier based on GDP growth. 
 
III. Cyclical adjustments of Basel II capital requirements 
The recent financial crisis, with its boom and bust lending cycle, has brought to the forefront the 
need to address the potential procyclical effects of risk-sensitive bank capital regulation. To see 
how Basel II capital requirements evolve over the business cycle, we construct a model economy 
that is composed of one commercial bank and ten firms. The model is practically a simulation of 
the Romanian economy (also its banking and financial sector) over the period 2000-2010. The 
firms’  sector  is  composed  of  2  corporate,  4  medium  and  4  small  companies,  whose  total 
exposures equal the aggregate credit portfolio to companies in the respective period. Our model 
economy is explicitly characterised by Romanian macroeconomic data regarding the specified 
period.  
To compute how regulatory capital levels would evolve over the business cycle, we estimate a 
logistic  model  of  the  one  month  ahead  PDs  of  Romanian  firms.  The  dependent  variable, 
DEFAULTt is a binary variable that takes value 1 when a firm defaults in the course of a year on 
its  outstanding  loans  at  the  end  of  the  previous  year,  and  zero  otherwise.  The  explanatory 
variables comprise characteristics of the firm, characteristics of its loans, and macroeconomic 
variables. A borrower is considered to have defaulted if it is 90 days overdue failing to meet his 
financial obligations on a certain loan or if, with high probability, it is considered to be unable to 
meet its obligations.  
The explanatory variables used in the model (dated in month t) are firm-specific variables and 
Romanian macroeconomic controls. COLt represents the proportion of guarantees in a firm’s 
borrowing, proxying the amount of collateral. Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006) show that banks 
ask for collateral to those firms that they denote as being riskier. AGEt captures the age of each 
firm, with the idea that younger firms are more prone to default than older ones. FSIZEt proxies 
the size of a firm, it is calculated via deflating the EADt growth of a firm by the consumer price 
index; FSIZEt enters the model in logarithmic terms. HISTDEFt is considered to be the main risk 
profile variable that captures whether a certain borrower defaulted in the past. In each observed 
default event, the variable value is increased by 1. Similar to HISTDEFt, we use HISTDELt, that 
stands for the borrowers’ record of overdue loans (1). UTILt is the ratio between the amount of 
credit drawn by a borrower and the credit line. 
The macroeconomic explanatory variables are GDPt, that is the rate growth of the gross domestic 
product, CREDITt, the rate growth of non-financial (commercial and industrial) loans over the 
one  month  period,  BETt,  the  monthly  average  return  of  the  Romanian  stock  market,  and 
MATURITYt, that is the ratio between long-term exposures (2) and the total exposures in the 
economy. Our database contains a total number of 126 monthly observations, over the last 10 
years.  
Table 1 in the Appendix presents the results of the estimation of the model (all coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 10% level). It’s interesting to note that some variables’ impacts on 
the default condition (especially macroeconomic variables) are significant after up to 3 or 4 lags. 
The results show that firms that post collateral when granted a loan have higher probabilities of 
default. Also, firms whose exposures show a bigger growth rate than the average, have bigger 
probability of default. Yet vital to notice that the coefficients of GDP and MATURITY_4 are 
negative, meaning that as the growth rate of real GDP and proportion of long term exposures 
increase in the model economy, the PD decreases. The coefficient of variable UTIL_3 shows that 
the higher the utilization of credit lines the higher the PD, so liquidity constraints also seem to  
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play a role in a firm’s default. Summing up the analysis of the logit model, we can say that firm’s 
defaults increase during downturns and decrease during and economic upward trend. 
 
PIT capital requirements 
Based on the results in Table 1, we compute the point in time (PIT) capital requirements, kit, for 
each borrower and month using the formula  
                      , 
the estimated probability of default, PDt, and assuming a loss given default (LGD) of 45%, as in 
the foundation IRB approach of Basel II. The PIT capital requirements per unit of loans for each 
month is calculated via  
    
∑      
∑      
, 
where lit denotes the value of the loans to firm i at the end of the month t. 
Figure 1 shows how PIT capital requirements evolve among the GDP in the observed period. The 
cyclical effects can be easily captured by applying the Hodrick-Prescott(HP) trend to the series, 
with a lambda value of 500. Regarding the HP-smoothed PIT capital series, a significant cyclical 
variation can be observed, with a gap of 5.82% between the peak and the worst point of the 
business cycle.  
 
TTC capital requirements – Adjusting the input of Basel II formula 
A possible solution for mitigating the cyclical effects of regulatory capital is the use of through 
the cycle (TTC) capital requirements. To estimate DEFAULT by the TTC approach, we follow 
the idea of Saurina and Trucharte (2007), that is, replacing the current values of macroeconomic 
variables by their average values over the sample period. We then compute the monthly capital 
requirements with the Basel II foundation IRB approach. The results of the re-estimation of the 
logit model are found in Table 2. Comparing TTC capital requirements with the PIT values, the 
cyclical  variability  declines  significantly,  as  it  can  be  observed  in  Figure  2.  The  peak-low 
deviation in the TTC series is of 3.03%, significantly better then in the PIT capital requirements.  
 
The business cycle multiplier - Adjusting the output of the Basel II formula   
The second approach for adjusting the Basel II capital requirements is to smooth the output of the 
formula. Basically, we adjust the PIT-capital requirements series obtained from Table 1 with a 
business cycle multiplier, as it can be seen in the following formula: 
 _              . 
The multiplier can be of various forms, but we use a simple and conventional approach: 
     2      
    _   
  
). 
In the equation kt denotes the original PIT capital series, and k_adjt the adjusted series. Regarding 
the multiplier equation, gt is the growth rate of one of the macroeconomic variables, g_avg its 
average over the sample period, hg its standard deviation over the sample period. N(x) is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function and α is a positive constant parameter. The key 
features of the business cycle multiplier are: it is continuous and increasing in the proxy for the 
business cycle gt, so capital requirements are increased in favourable periods and lowered during 
downturns or recessions. Also,   is bounded, so capital requirements do not increase without 
bound or become negative. Parameter α is defined as 0.1, however, we tested various other 
values. The purpose of α is to minimize the root mean square deviation (RMSD) of the adjusted 
series, and also to obtain a reasonable amount of capital adjustment. Summing up, we choose the 
value  of  α  that  is  best  in  terms  of  smoothing  the  cyclical  component  of  the  pit  capital 
requirements series. Figure 3 shows the  -adjusted capital series (when g=GDP), together with  
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the PIT series. Note that the adjusted series has been applied a HP-filter of lambda=500, so that 
the cyclical-smoothing can be easily observed. 
 
IV. Results 
Taking into account the HP-filter fitted values, we compare the different smoothing procedures 
by computing the RMSD of each adjusted capital requirements series. The values obtained are 
shown in Table 3. The output-formula adjusted values show a much smaller deviation, as the 
TTC-series stands out with a RMSD of 0.16%. Regarding the output-smoothing procedure, a 
choice has to be made in order to specify the best smoothing macro-component. As the GDP and 
CREDIT deviations are more or less the same, we consider the amount of adjustment made 
during economic booms and downturns for the respective series. Results are shown in Table 4.  
In terms of the GDP adjustment, regulatory capital levels should increase with approx. 1.31% 
during an economic growth period and decrease with 4.03% during a recession. Having a look at 
the CREDIT-adjustment, results say that capital levels should increase with 0.86% in case of an 
upward trend and decrease with 0.88% in case of a downturn in the economy. As the CREDIT 
variable  adjustment  makes  no  significant  (reasonable)  changes  regarding  Basel  II  regulatory 
capital,  we  consider  the  output  adjustment  based  on  GDP  growth  to  be  the  best  smoothing 
procedure. As mentioned earlier, Figure 3 shows the GDP smoothed series together with the real 
GDP. Note that this result is not due to the fact that GDP growth is one of the explanatory 
variables in our logit model. 
 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we focused on finding the optimal method for mitigating the procyclical effects of 
Basel II capital regulation. We analysed two major approaches regarding the issue, which is 
estimating TTC PDs, and fine-tuning the output of the Basel II formula. By building up a model-
economy  that  simulates  the  Romanian  banking  and finance sector,  we  observed  that a  GDP 
growth based smoothing of Basel II capital requirements would be a good solution regarding the 
procyclicality issue. However, we emphasize that the TTC-approach should not be “written off”, 
as it is clearly a simple and effective way to make a quick and basic-level fine-tunement to 
regulatory capital levels. We stick to our statement knowing that the use of TTC PDs has been 
criticized by Gordy and Howells (2006), who underline the fact that changes in a bank’s capital 
requirements over time would be only weakly correlated with changes in its economic capital, 
and there would be no means to infer economic capital from regulatory capital. Our results are 
similar to those of Repullo, Saurina and Trucharte (2010) agreeing that GDP growth based output 
adjustment of the Basel II formula is the “way to go” in terms of simplicity, transparency, low 
cost of implementation and even consistency with the idea of a single aggregate risk factor that 
underlies the capital requirements of Basel II. 
Two major issues are still the purpose of our further research regarding Basel II. The first one, 
regulatory arbitrage, is mostly threatening safe and sound banking in the European Union, where 
its hazard is higher than in the countries outside the EU. To reduce this hazard, the specialists 
started to create a supervisory convergence. From this step, they expect that the discretionary 
assets will become reduced. The European Commission started a public consultation in 2010, in 
association with the fact that the 2009th Decree concerning the CRAs does not handle a lot of 
problems regarding the credit rating agencies. In this consultation document they discuss in detail 
the possible payment models and new measures, which prevent the potential risk of a rating 
arbitrage. The supervision of the rating agencies will be done by the European Securities and 
Markets Authority. The second, regarding the correct estimation of PD-LGD correlation, is a 
vital in building up a safe and sound banking system. The model standing behind the Basel II 
formula is the standard one factor model developed by Vasicek (1987). Many studies argue that 
this method cannot capture well the correlation between PD and LGD on a large (asymptotic)  
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portfolio. The innovative approach of Witzany (2009) proposes a two factor model. Results of 
testing the model prove that it is able to estimate more punctually and as realistic as possible the 
correlation between the two parameters, implemented on real banking data. The lack of reliable 




(1) Overdue loans are the ones that have been paid before the 90-day threshold. 
(2) Long term exposures are the ones that exhibit 5 years. 
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VIII. Appendix 
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Figure 1: PIT Capital Requirements Vs. GDP 
growth 
Source: Own calculations 
Source: Authors’ calculations  Source: Authors’ calculations 
Souce: Authors’ calculations  Souce: Authors’ calculations  
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Figure 2: PIT Capital Requirements Vs.TTC Capital Requirements and  GDP 
growth 
Source: Own calculations 
Figure 3: GDP-adjusted Capital Requirements Vs. GDP growth 
Source: Own calculations 